Mass media have been accused of cultivating anti-immigrant sentiments in Western societies. Most studies on this topic, however, have not made a distinction between the types of television program (information vs. entertainment) or television station (public vs. commercial). Adopting a comparative approach, we use data from the six waves of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2002–2012, n = 162,987) to assess the relationship between individual and aggregate level patterns of television consumption and anti-immigrant sentiments in European societies. Individual television viewing (...) time is positively associated with anti-immigrant sentiments, while frequent exposure to news and information programs is associated with lower levels of anti-immigrant sentiments. At the aggregate level we observe a positive effect of the total viewing time in society on anti-immigrant sentiments. In the conclusion we offer some suggestions on how this effect could be explained. (shrink)

According to the two visual systems model, the visual processing of objects divides into semantic and pragmatic processing. We provide various criteria for this distinction. Further, we argue that both the semantic and pragmatic processing of visual information about objects should be divided into low-level processing and high-level processing. Finally, we re-evaluate the contribution of the human parietal lobe to the concious visual perception of spatial relations among objects.

Ways of Seeing is a unique collaboration between an eminent philosopher and a world famous neuroscientist. It focuses on one of the most basic human functions - vision. What does it mean to 'see'. It brings together electrophysiological studies, neuropsychology, psychophysics, cognitive psychology, and philosophy of mind. The first truly interdisciplinary book devoted to the topic of vision, it will make a valuable contribution to the field of cognitive science.

Recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of action have considerably enlarged our understanding of human motor cognition. In particular, the activity of the mirror system, first discovered in the brain of non-human primates, provides an observer with the understanding of a perceived action by means of the motor simulation of the agent's observed movements. This discovery has raised the prospects of a motor theory of social cognition. Since human social cognition includes the ability to mindread, many motor theorists of social (...) cognition try to bridge the gap between motor cognition and mindreading by endorsing a simulation account of mindreading. Here, we express our skepticism about the motor theory of social cognition. (shrink)

This is the first chapter of Ways of Seeing co-authored with Marc Jeannerod. We ague for a representational approach to the puzzles of both visual perception and visually-guided actions.

Human vision raises a number of puzzles. Among them are the puzzles of visual experience: how to provide a scientific understanding of the phenomenal character of the visual experiences of the shapes, textures, colors, orientations and motion of perceived objects? How can a purely subjective visual experience be the basis of so much objective knowledge of the world? Visually guided actions raise a different puzzle: how can actions directed towards a target be so accurate in the absence of the agent’s (...) awareness of many of the target’s visual attributes? Ways of Seeing has three related goals, the first of which is to make the case for a broadly representational approach to the above set of puzzles. The second goal of WoS is to argue that the version of the ‘two-visual systems’ model of human vision best supported by the current empirical evidence has the resources to solve the puzzle of visually guided actions, which has been at the center of much recent work in the cognitive neuroscience of vision and action. The third goal of WoS is to draw attention to some of the tensions between acceptance of the two-visual systems model of human vision and some influential views about the nature and function of the content of visual experience espoused by philosophers in response to the puzzles raised by visual experience. (shrink)

The indeterminacy problem is one of the most prominent objections against naturalistic theories of content. In this essay I present this difficulty and argue that extant accounts are unable to solve it. Then, I develop a particular version of teleosemantics, which I call ’explanation-based teleosemantics’, and show how this outstanding problem can be addressed within the framework of a powerful naturalistic theory.

How should we choose between uncertain prospects in which different possible people might exist at different levels of wellbeing? Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey offer an egalitarian answer to this question. I give some reasons to reject their answer and then sketch an alternative, which I call person-affecting prioritarianism.

In this article, Herrie and Sørensen examine the mediation of typing indicators (“…”) in online messaging. Their point of departure is a scene from the contemporary novel Exciting Times by Naoise Dolan (2020), in which the ‘dots’ play a prominent role. Their analysis shows how typing indicators, as interface design, mediate the complex communication situation in which they take part: from being mere signals, they have slipped into our emotional lives. From a semiotic perspective (Charles S. Peirce), the authors define (...) typing indicators as uncertain indices which through unknowability and suspense establish an attentional presence. In continuation hereof, the authors argue that the acts of writing and waiting in contemporary attentional ecologies (Yves Citton) through the mediation of typing indicators as indicators of attentional presence, could be considered a mode of caring (Bernard Stiegler). (shrink)

ABSTRACTNew methods of calculating indices from the dot-probe task measure temporal dynamics in attention bias or fluctuations in attention bias towards and away from emotional stimuli over time. H...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.2 (2000) 167-187 [Access article in PDF] Amelot de La Houssaye (1634-1706) Annotates Tacitus Jacob Soll Thousands have worked on Tacitus. Some have translated him, others have commented on him. Some have put his text into paraphrases, because of his obscurity: Some others have sucked out the juice and marrow, which is to say, the Sentences, Aphorismes, Apophtegms, and the Political Axioms, of (...) which he is as fertile, as he is sterile in words. His Translators have made him speak every Language, well or badly, according to what they understood or did not. Of his Commentators, some, as if they were Grammarians, have only picked through his Latin, and his fashions of speaking, which are all extraordinary. The others, like students of Politics, neither stopping to look at his phrases, nor his diction, have studied to penetrate the mysteries, and the secrets of the Art-of-governing, of which he has been the Master, and universal Oracle, for more than five-hundred years. 1Thus wrote Nicolas-Abraham Amelot de La Houssaye in the preface of his book, Tibère: Discours politiques sur Tacite (Paris: chez Frédéric Léonard, 1684). He was describing what has become known as the Tacitist movement of political theory, based on the work of the Roman historian Tacitus, which began in the 1580s and lasted until the French Revolution. 2 The practice of translating, commenting [End Page 167] on, or writing like Tacitus began in earnest in the late sixteenth century. Authoritative Latin editions as well as vernacular translations flourished and great kings turned to these now accessible texts as manuals for ruling. 3 Tacitus provided examples from history which could be used to form the basis of a practical political "science." Alongside Machiavelli, practitioners of reason of state placed the works of Tacitus as the founding stones of their humanist canon of secular political philosophy. 4 Marc-Antoine Muret began teaching Tacitus at the University of Rome in 1580, and at the same time Justus Lipsius and Carolus Paschalius began a Latinist tradition of commenting on Tacitus's works. 5 Lipsius, by far the most influential of the sixteenth-century Tacitists, was not only a philologist interested in reestablishing Tacitus's original text but also a commentator who sought to extract moral and political sententiae from the Roman historian. 6 Thus humanist scholarly practices served as the basis of Tacitean political theory as historical exempla, verified by philology, became useful for practical politics. 7 Scholarship and secular political science were bound for the long journey into the modern age. 8 [End Page 168]If humanist scholarship formed the basis of Tacitean political theory, it is also the key for understanding how it worked. Tacitism was an editorial practice and thus scholarly editors became political theorists. Justus Lipsius did not attempt to write his own version of a Tacitean Annales. Instead, he chopped up Tacitus's text, making a commonplace notebook for absolutist princes with his Politicorum libri sex (Leiden: Plantin, 1589). 9 Understanding the Lipsian tradition--the process by which Tacitus was read, broken down and "represented" by scholarly editors--clarifies an unexplored yet essential element of the evolution of secular political theory from a tool of Absolutism to an arm of revolutionary republicanism. 10The most striking example of the Lipsian tradition can be found in the works of Amelot de La Houssaye, whose vision of Tacitean scholarship we have already seen. Between 1670 and his death in 1706 Amelot was the most prolific translator and commentator of Tacitus in France. Between 1676 and 1808, at least 107 editions of 23 different works by Amelot were published in French, almost all Tacitean in nature. 11 These books were widely read and inspired numerous foreign editions. The unifying thread of this extraordinarily large corpus of works is Amelot de La Houssaye's fascination with Tacitus. He not only translated and commented on Tacitus; he also represented the major works of secular political philosophy of his time as Tacitean in origin. Machiavelli, for example, was "proven... (shrink)

The first volume of the Brandeis University Summer Institute lecture series of 1970 on theories of interacting elementary particles, consisting of four sets of lectures. Every summer since 1959 Brandeis University has conducted a lecture series centered on various areas of theoretical physics. The areas are sufficiently broad to interest a large number of physicists and the lecturers are among the original explorers of these areas. The 1970 lectures, presented in two volumes, are on theories of interacting elementary particles. The (...) four lecturers of Volume 1, and the range of the topics they cover, are as follows: Stephen L. Adler on "Perturbation Theory Anomalies": introduction and review of perturbation theory; the VVA triangle anomaly; absence of radiative corrections; generalizations of our results; connection between Ward identity anomalies and commutator anomalies; applications of the Bjorken limit; and breakdown of the Bjorken limit in perturbation theory. Stanley Mandelstam on "Dynamical Applications of the Veneziano formula for the four-point scalar amplitude; factorization; the operator formalism; Veneziano-type quark models; and higher-order Feynman-like diagrams. Steven Weinberg on "Dynamic and Algebraic Symmetries": Introduction; hadron electrodynamics; local symmetries; and chirality. Wolfhart Zimmermann on "Local Operator Products and Renormalization in Quantum Field Theory": introduction; renormalization; operator product expansions; and local field equations. The second volume contains lectures by Rudolf Haag on observables and fields, by Maurice Jacob on duality, by Michael Reed on non-Fock representations, and by Bruno Zumino on effective Lagrangians and broken symmetries. (shrink)

English summary: Marc Andre Wiegand analyzes the neo-Kantian premises of Gustav Radbruch's legal philosophy.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Standardly, epistemic peers regarding a given matter are said to be people of equal competence who share all relevant evidence. Alternatively, one can define epistemic peers regarding a given matter as people who are equally likely to be right about that matter. I argue that a definition in terms of likelihood captures the essence of epistemic peerhood better than the standard definition or any variant of it. What is more, a likelihood definition implies the truth of the central thesis in (...) the debate on peer disagreement, the so-called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give the opinions of our peers the same weight we give our own. Adopting a likelihood definition, however, does not end the debate on peer disagreement, because the alleged theoretical alternatives to the Equal Weight View, reinterpreted in the light of a likelihood definition, can in fact be shown to be compatible with this view—though the reinterpreted versions may appear less plausible than the original ones. (shrink)

The evidence that we get from peer disagreement is especially problematic from a Bayesian point of view since the belief revision caused by a piece of such evidence cannot be modelled along the lines of Bayesian conditionalisation. This paper explains how exactly this problem arises, what features of peer disagreements are responsible for it, and what lessons should be drawn for both the analysis of peer disagreements and Bayesian conditionalisation as a model of evidence acquisition. In particular, it is pointed (...) out that the same characteristic of evidence from disagreement that explains the problems with Bayesian conditionalisation also suggests an interpretation of suspension of belief in terms of imprecise probabilities. (shrink)

A commonly neglected feature of the so-called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give our peers’ opinions the same weight we give our own, is its prima facie incompatibility with the common picture of philosophy as an armchair activity: an intellectual effort to seek a priori knowledge. This view seems to imply that our beliefs are more likely to be true if we leave our armchair in order to find out whether there actually are peers who, by disagreeing (...) with us, force us to revise our beliefs. This article argues that the Equal Weight View should be spelled out in such a way that not only actual peer disagreement requires us to revise our beliefs, but also merely possible peer disagreement. This result is not a reductio ad absurdum of the view. Quite the opposite: it shows that the view is, contrary to appearance, compatible with our common way of doing philosophy. (shrink)

Unknown peers create a problem for those epistemologists who argue that we should be conciliatory in cases of peer disagreement. The standard interpretation of ‘being conciliatory’ has it that we should revise our opinions concerning a specific subject matter whenever we encounter someone who is as competent and well informed as we are concerning this subject matter (and thus is our peer) and holds a different opinion. As a consequence, peers whom we have never encountered and who are hence unknown (...) to us are not taken into account. This, however, appears odd; not only because it is an accidental matter which peers we happen to encounter and which not, but also because it would allow people to deliberately isolate themselves from any kind of intellectual exchange on the topic under consideration. The paper argues that we should take the problem of unknown peers seriously, and that disregarding the problem is an instance of the more general mistake of assuming that evidential quality and justified believability can be dealt with separately. Moreover, a solution to the problem of unknown peers is suggested. (shrink)

Dieser Text geht der Frage nach, ob und, wenn ja, inwieweit sich Gedankenexperimente in der praktischen Philosophie in ihrer Struktur und ihrer epistemischen Signifikanz von Gedankenexperimenten in der theoretischen Philosophie oder in den Naturwissenschaften unterscheiden. Anhand einer allgemeinen Strukturanalyse von Gedankenexperimenten wird dabei aufgezeigt, dass bei Gedankenexperimenten in der praktischen Philosophie zwar häufig die angemessene Bewertung eines zugrunde gelegten Szenarios im Zentrum steht und nicht, wie zum Beispiel in theoretischen Philosophie oft, dessen angemessene Beschreibung, dass dieser Unterschied aber kaum Auswirkungen (...) hat auf die prinzipielle Anwendbarkeit – abgesehen von einer bisher übersehenen Konsequenz: Man darf in einem Gedankenexperiment nicht annehmen, dass moralische, ästhetische oder entscheidungstheoretische Prinzipien in unterschiedlichen möglichen Welten verschieden sind. Andernfalls käme dem Gedankenexperiment keinerlei epistemische Signifikanz zu. (shrink)

Scientists have long counseled against interpreting animal behavior in terms of human emotions, warning that such anthropomorphizing limits our ability to understand animals as they really are. Yet what are we to make of a female gorilla in a German zoo who spent days mourning the death of her baby? Or a wild female elephant who cared for a younger one after she was injured by a rambunctious teenage male? Or a rat who refused to push a lever for food (...) when he saw that doing so caused another rat to be shocked? Aren’t these clear signs that animals have recognizable emotions and moral intelligence? With _Wild Justice_ Marc Bekoff and Jessica Pierce unequivocally answer yes. Marrying years of behavioral and cognitive research with compelling and moving anecdotes, Bekoff and Pierce reveal that animals exhibit a broad repertoire of moral behaviors, including fairness, empathy, trust, and reciprocity. Underlying these behaviors is a complex and nuanced range of emotions, backed by a high degree of intelligence and surprising behavioral flexibility. Animals, in short, are incredibly adept social beings, relying on rules of conduct to navigate intricate social networks that are essential to their survival. Ultimately, Bekoff and Pierce draw the astonishing conclusion that there is no moral gap between humans and other species: morality is an evolved trait that we unquestionably share with other social mammals. Sure to be controversial, _Wild Justice_ offers not just cutting-edge science, but a provocative call to rethink our relationship with—and our responsibilities toward—our fellow animals. (shrink)

This paper delves into the striking parallels between the linguistic patterns of Large Language Models (LLMs) and the concepts of psychosis in Lacanian psychoanalysis. Lacanian theory, with its focus on the formal and logical underpinnings of psychosis, provides a compelling lens to juxtapose human cognition and AI mechanisms. LLMs, such as GPT-4, appear to replicate the intricate metaphorical and metonymical frameworks inherent in human language. Although grounded in mathematical logic and probabilistic analysis, the outputs of LLMs echo the nuanced linguistic (...) associations found in metaphor and metonymy, suggesting a mirroring of human linguistic structures. A pivotal point in this discourse is the exploration of “absolute metaphors”—core gaps in reasoning discernible in both AI models and human thought processes and central to the Lacanian conceptualization of psychosis. Despite the traditional divide between AI research and continental philosophy, this analysis embarks on an innovative journey, utilizing Lacanian philosophy to unravel the logic of AI, using concepts established in the continental discourse on logic, rather than the analytical tradition. (shrink)

Richard Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory is becoming the received view of natural kinds in the philosophy of science. However, a problem with HPC Theory is that it neglects many kinds highlighted by scientific classifications while at the same time endorsing kinds rejected by science. In other words, there is a mismatch between HPC kinds and the kinds of science. An adequate account of natural kinds should accurately track the classifications of successful science. We offer an alternative account of natural (...) kinds that better recognizes the diversity of epistemic aims scientists have for constructing classifications. That account introduces the idea of a classificatory program and provides criteria for judging whether a classificatory program identifies natural kinds. (shrink)